

平成18年(上期)実施
東北大学大学院情報科学研究科
博士課程前期2年の課程・後期3年の課程入学試験問題

専門試験科目
第6群 (心理・哲学群)

注意

- 専門科目試験問題は、以下の12問である。
- 前期2年の課程の受験者は、4問を選んでそれぞれ答案用紙に解答しなさい。
- 前期2年の課程外国人留学生受験者は、2問を選んでそれぞれ答案用紙に解答しなさい。
- 後期3年の課程の受験者は、2問を選んでそれぞれ答案用紙に解答し、さらに学習心理情報学及び認知心理情報学に配属を希望する者は小論文を作成しなさい。
- 各答案用紙上の

問題番号

 の空欄に、解答する問題番号を、
- さらに、

受験番号：

 には受験番号を、それぞれ記入しなさい。
- 試験時間： 10:00 - 13:00

専門科目試験問題 第6群 (心理・哲学群)

1. 脳とコンピュータの類似点及び相違点を述べなさい
2. 注意と作業記憶の関係を論じなさい
3. 反応時間から分かることを具体例を挙げて述べなさい
4. 記憶における処理水準(level of processing)の効果について説明しなさい
5. 文章理解における推論について、具体例を挙げて説明しなさい
6. 分散分析における交互作用について説明しなさい
7. プラトンの「想起説」について説明しなさい
8. アリストテレスの「観想」について説明しなさい
9. 論理学での「前件否定の誤謬」について、事例を挙げながら、簡潔に説明しなさい
10. ライプニッツの「モノアド」について説明しなさい
11. カントの「先天的総合判断」について説明しなさい
12. デリダの「脱構築」について説明しなさい

平成18年8月29日

平成18年(上期)実施
東北大学大学院情報科学研究科
博士課程前期2年の課程・後期3年の課程入学試験問題

外国語 (英語)

第6群 (心理・哲学群)

注意

○解答は答案用紙に書きなさい。

○試験時間： 14:30 - 15:30

1. []の部分(a, b)を訳しなさい。
2. the verification account of meaningとは何かを説明しなさい。

Although our own interests in mindreading became increasingly multifarious as we dug into this interdisciplinary project, our interest stemmed originally from philosophical concerns. Since the philosophical interest of mindreading may be somewhat less readily apparent, we will explain in some detail why discussion of folk psychology, theory of mind, and mindreading has played such an important role in the philosophy of mind.

[To appreciate philosophers' fascination with these themes, it will be useful to begin with a brief reminder about the two most important questions in the philosophy of mind, and the problems engendered by what was for centuries the most influential answer to one of those questions. The questions are the Mind-Body Problem, which asks how mental phenomena are related to physical phenomena, and the Problem of Other Minds, which asks how we can know about the mental states of other people. On Descartes's proposed solution to the Mind-Body Problem, there are two quite different sorts of substances in the universe: physical substance, which is located in space and time, and mental substance, which is located in time but not in space. Mental phenomena, according to Descartes, are events or states occurring in a mental substance, while physical phenomena are events or states occurring in a physical substance.]^a Descartes insisted that there is two-way causal interaction between the mental and the physical, though many philosophers find it puzzling how the two could interact if one is in space and the other isn't. Another problem with the Cartesian^(注1) view is that it seems to make the Other Minds Problem quite intractable. If, as Descartes believed, I am the only person who can experience my mental states, then there seems to be no way for you to rule out the hypothesis that I am a mindless zombie^(注2) -- a physical body that merely behaves as though it was causally linked to a mind.

In the middle years of the twentieth century the verificationist account of meaning had a major impact on philosophical thought. According to the verificationists, the meaning of an empirical claim is closely linked to the observations that would verify the claim. Influenced by verificationism, philosophical behaviorists argued that the Cartesian account of the mind as the 'ghost in the machine' (to use Ryle's memorable image) was profoundly mistaken (Ryle 1949). If ordinary mental state words like 'belief', 'desire', and 'pain' are to be meaningful, they maintained, these terms cannot refer to unobservable events taking place inside a person (or, worse still, not

located in space at all). Rather, the meaning of sentences invoking these terms must be analyzed in terms of conditional sentences specifying how someone would behave under various circumstances. So, for example, a philosophical behaviorist might suggest that the meaning of

(1) John believes that snow is white

could be captured by something like the following:

(2) If you ask John, 'Is snow white?' he will respond affirmatively.

Perhaps the most serious difficulty for philosophical behaviorists was that their meaning analyses typically turned out to be either obviously mistaken or circular -- invoking one mental term in the analysis of another. So, for example, contrary to (2), even though John believes that snow is white, he may not respond affirmatively unless he is *paying attention*, *wants* to let you know what he thinks, *believes* that this can be done by responding affirmatively, etc.

[While philosophical behaviorists were gradually becoming convinced that there is no way around this circularity problem, a very similar problem was confronting philosophers seeking verificationist accounts of the meaning of scientific terms. Verificationism requires that the meaning of a theoretical term must be specifiable in terms of observables. But when philosophers actually tried to provide such definitions, they always seemed to require additional theoretical terms. The reaction to this problem in the philosophy of science was to explore a quite different account of how theoretical terms get their meaning. Rather than being defined exclusively in terms of observables, this new account proposed, a cluster of theoretical terms might get their meaning collectively by being embedded within an empirical theory. The meaning of any given theoretical term lies in its theory-specified interconnections with other terms, both observational and theoretical.]^b

"Mindreading" by Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich

注 1 : Cartesian : デカルトの

注 2 : zombie : ゾンビ (動く死体)